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Across the United States, pretrial incarceration is a major driver of climbing jail populations. 
One specific reform, called pretrial services is being instituted to some degree all across the 
country; however, most Americans still do not have access to these reforms. This paper will 
examine the distribution of pretrial reform and the partisan factors that influence access to 
pretrial services. Using both state-level analysis and county-level analysis of Virginia, this paper 
shows that areas with higher proportions of Republican voters are less likely to have pretrial 
services. The final chapter shows that this effect is partially explainable in Virginia due to the 
fact that more conservative counties are less likely to cooperate with other nearby counties and 
prefer to cooperate with other conservative counties.  These findings imply that pretrial reform 
must be viewed as not simply a criminal justice or procedural problem, but as a distinctly 
political issue. States like Virginia that desire more widespread reform should alter inducements 
to encourage county cooperation for conservative districts to ensure that pretrial services is 
available to all citizens.  
 
Introduction 
 
When Kalief Browder was 16 years old, he was accused of stealing a backpack. He was sent to 
Rikers Island Jail Complex where he stayed for three years, two of those in solitary confinement, 
while he endured abuse by both prisoners and guards. He was never convicted of a crime. After 
three years, the prosecutors dropped the charge and he was released; but he could not escape 
from the experience he had in jail. He began to recreate the conditions of solitary confinement in 
his parent’s house, and in June 2015, he took his own life (Schwirtz & Winerip, 2015). This 
story is disturbing, but not unique. Sixty percent of the current American jail population is 
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awaiting trial (Jones & Alysia, 2018). The average defendant will wait ten months in jail before 
getting to trial (Dalakian, 2018) all while ostensibly being presumed innocent by the 
government. If they are too poor to pay their bail, they will remain in jail, losing jobs, friends and 
community connections. If they have the means to pay, they can be released within 48 hours.  
 
What is Pretrial? 
 
The time between a person’s arrest and when a case is disposed, through jury trial or a guilty 
plea, dropped charges or otherwise is called pretrial.  Many people are released from custody 
pending their trial because they have been deemed to not be a threat to society or they have been 
able to secure enough money to pay bail. Bail serves as a guarantee. If a defendant is able to pay 
the amount of money set by a judicial officer, they are released and when they appear for their 
trial, they are given the money back. In 2006, the average bail amount in large counties in the 
United States was $55,500. For comparison, raising $400 in the event of an emergency would be 
a challenge for almost half of Americans (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
2016). 
 
Faced with these facts, many Americans turn to bail bondsmen, who generally charge a non-
refundable 10% fee in exchange for posting the entire bail amount. These bondsmen therefore 
take on the responsibility of ensuring a defendant’s appearance in court, which can take many 
forms (see: Jones & Alysia, 2018). Bail is set by judicial officers, generally magistrates or 
judges. These officers must quickly determine an amount of money sufficient to ensure the 
appearance of a defendant but not so large that the defendant will remain imprisoned simply 
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because they cannot pay. Often, a judicial officer must make this determination without any 
knowledge of a defendant’s financial situation (Dalakan, 2018). 
 
Across the country, criminal courts at all levels are creating pretrial services offices. These 
offices serve two purposes: risk assessment and supervision. While risk assessment has 
traditionally been strictly the purview of judicial officers, more and more criminal justice 
systems are implementing actuarial risk assessment instruments (ARAI). These instruments are 
computer models, developed to predict the risk of a defendant absconding or reoffending. There 
are many different types of ARAI and they will be discussed in detail in the second chapter of 
this study.  
 
No analysis of American criminal justice systems can withstand scrutiny without including a 
discussion on the role of race. Many scholars have explored the pervasive role of conscious and 
subconscious bias in justice systems, specifically as it relates to pretrial release (see: Heaton, 
Mayson, and Stevenson 2017; Dobbie, Goldin and Yang 2018). Generally, these studies show 
that discretion granted to judicial officers in the determination of pretrial release or bond amount 
is ripe for subconscious bias to play a role. Judges systematically deem black defendants as more 
risky than white defendants forming another link in a long chain of race-based failures of our 
justice system. Pretrial reform is therefore doubly valuable to communities of color as it can 
provide judicial officers with race-neutral1 ways of evaluating risk. Although race will not 
always be at the forefront of this study, it is important to consider that justice systems throughout 
the United States often do not treat people of different races consistently or fairly.  
 
                                               
1 The race-neutrality of risk assessment methods is often at issue, and will be explored further in Chapter 1 
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The expanded use of ARAI as part of a pretrial services program with the intention of increasing 
bail-free release, or Release on Own Recognizance (ROR), has tremendous potential to reduce 
the burden placed on defendants by the justice system. Prosecutors, Chiefs of Police and the 
American Civil Liberties Union have all voiced their support for the increased use of pretrial 
services. The cooperation of these organizations is notable, especially because they are often on 
opposite sides of divisive issues. Their support is prima facie evidence for a consensus among 
practitioners about the positive value added to the criminal justice process by pretrial services.  
 
Is this support shared by the general public and, by extension, politicians? It has been well 
established that liberal constituencies produce more liberal local policy (Wright, Erikson, McIver 
1987). However, the mechanism is subject to debate. People are generally ignorant of state and 
local government issues, and state policy issues are often abstruse. How can citizens influence 
their state and local representatives on a range of issues on which they have no knowledge? 
Wright, Erikson and McIver propose that voters have an understanding of archetypal party 
candidates so, while they may not be aware of a specific candidate’s position, they have a 
general sense of what a typical Republican and a typical Democrat supports. This can go to 
explain some of the correlation between partisan outcomes and the partisanship of constituent 
groups. This of course is an incomplete picture (see Tausanovitch, 2019), but this explanation 
continues to represent the most likely mechanism for state and local representation.  
 
To be sure, elected legislators have control over pretrial services expansion. Reforms in New 
Jersey, California and Kentucky have shown that legislative action can quickly transform the 
level and type of access that citizens have to pretrial services. However, gaps in legislative action 
or lack of action can shift the locus of reform onto bureaucrats that administer court services. 
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Berkman and Plutzer (2010) provide a framework for the mechanism by which legislation and 
bureaucratic discretion interact. A legislative standard provides a baseline of service that will be 
provided. Above it exists a range of possible services that go above and beyond those mandated 
by law. The range of these possibilities is determined by the level of discretion wielded by the 
bureaucrats tasked with carrying out these services. In the context of pretrial services, many 
localities simply provide the statutory minimum; in Virginia, there is no mandate for pretrial 
services, so the minimum is no service at all. However, some bureaucrats use their discretion to 
coordinate county cooperation, apply for partial funding from the State and operate a pretrial 
services office. Why do some bureaucrats exercise discretion in this way while others do not? 
Does partisanship play a role in this decision? This study will seek to establish a link between 
partisanship and availability of pretrial services using multiple units of analysis.  
 
This Study 
 
The analysis done in this study will be divided into three sections: (1) National Trends, (2) a 
Case Study of Virginia and (3) a Cooperation Model for Virginia counties. Each section uses a 
mixed method combining personal interviews with stakeholders from all corners of the justice 
system including judges, prosecutors and scholars with quantitative analysis analyzing factors 
that impact the availability of pretrial services.  
 
In the first chapter, I will explore how the practice of bail in America has shaped the pretrial 
process and describe the function and creation of pretrial services offices. I establish a 
framework adapted from existing work on bureaucratic functioning wherein unelected decision 
makers such as prosecutors are constrained by statutory guidelines for procedure but are afforded 
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a great deal of discretion. Discretion provides avenues for partisan values to impact the pretrial 
process. Traditionally, pretrial reform has not been coded as a Republican or Democratic issue. 
However, data analyzed in this chapter will begin to suggest large disparities in access to pretrial 
Reform between states with liberal constituencies and those with conservative constituencies.  
 
To better understand the difference in availability of pretrial services, the next chapter is a case 
study of pretrial services in Virginia. Virginia lends itself particularly well to this study due to a 
number of factors. Roughly three quarters of Virginia counties have access to pretrial services, 
which represents a level of variation that is significant enough to warrant further attention. 
Additionally, a group of Prosecutors in Virginia have taken up reforms to the pretrial system, 
which was made possible by the presence of the pretrial services offices. Studying these activist 
Prosecutors will help to examine the partisan flavor of pretrial reform. Virginia also was one of 
the first states to create and validate its own ARAI. This chapter will examine the creation and 
implementation of this tool. Finally, statistical analysis will show that the partisanship of a 
Virginia county is effective at predicting if that county will have a pretrial services office and the 
level at which that office is funded by both the Commonwealth of Virginia and the county itself.  
 
In the final chapter, I will propose one explanation for the predictive power of partisanship 
established in the preceding chapter. Namely, that counties with more conservative 
constituencies are less likely to cooperate with surrounding counties. In Virginia, 33 pretrial 
services offices serve 100 counties. Often, the burden of establishing a pretrial services office is 
too much to bear for a single county. Cooperation between counties is able to offset costs and 
provide those arrested in each cooperating county with pretrial services. Maximum likelihood 
analysis will show that less conservative counties are more likely to cooperate and that 
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conservative counties tend not to partner unless they can partner with another conservative 
county.   
 
Ultimately, access to pretrial services follows recognizable patterns. These patterns are strongly 
associated with measures of partisanship across states as well as counties in Virginia. Such a 
correlation could be surprising to scholars who emphasize lack of public opinion on local and 
procedural issues. However, the presence of such a strong relationship goes to show the power of 
partisan differences in determining seemingly non-partisan goals and structures through both 
outright opposition as well as more nuanced considerations like decisions to cooperate between 
counties.  
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Chapter 1: National Trends 
A Brief Legislative History of Federal Pretrial 
 
Since  the advent of bail in agrarian England, pretrial problems have been primarily understood 
as bail problems. This is likely due to the close relationship between the two. Historically, the 
main purpose of bail has been to guarantee the appearance of a defendant while they await their 
trial outside of jail. The creation of a landless underclass made absconding from trial a viable 
option, thus bail was born. In the modern age the practice of bail began to be used not just to 
insure appearance in court, but to detain people who were unable to pay the bail amount. This 
chapter will analyze the relevant history of pretrial reform in America as context for changes 
happening currently, then it will investigate factors that can promote or prevent reform.   
 
The practices surrounding modern American bail were first identified as problematic by scholars 
in the late 1920s, who documented abuses of the pretrial system. In The Bail System in Chicago, 
Arthur Beeley found defendants being held for long periods of time before charges were filed 
and were often refused the ability to post cash bail themselves. Beeley highlighted the close 
relationship between bondsmen, judges and jailers. These relationships often funneled 
defendants to certain bondsmen and resulted in prohibitively high bail amounts. While this 
closeness may not have been explicitly illegal, in Beeley’s view, it was certainly unethical. This 
incisive report and others like it prompted the first regulation of the bail bond industry. However, 
the industry was successful in shaping the outcome of the legislation to a point where it mostly 
put up barriers to entry and entrenched existing bondsmen (Beeley, 1927). 
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After World War II the issue of bonds resurfaced with renewed scholarly interest; by 1950, 
money bonds were nearly ubiquitous and often well outside of a defendant’s ability to pay 
(Thomas, 1976). Research began to focus on the adverse effects of high bail amounts, even 
beyond the pretrial phase. Pennsylvania law professor Caleb Foote published a study showing 
that those who were too poor to pay their bail were significantly more likely to both be convicted 
and serve longer sentences (Foote, Markel & Woolley, 1954). In response to these revelations, 
activists formed the first ever pretrial services agency in New York to investigate arrestees and 
recommend that they be released on their own recognizance if they had sufficient community 
connections. The efforts of these activists were rigorously monitored and in the small treatment 
population there was no rise in the failure to appear rate (Vera Institute of Justice, 1972) as was 
predicted by opponents of the project. This project, called the Vera Institute, conducted 
rudimentary reports of an arrestee’s so-called community ties through interviews with arrestees 
and verification. If the arrestee’s community ties were sufficiently strong, the Institute would 
recommend release on own recognizance (ROR). The Institute also stayed in contact with 
participants, notifying them about approaching court dates and other deadlines. The structure 
developed by the Vera Institute would go to form the template for other efforts across the 
country.  
 
In 1964, the New York Office of Probation took over the screening process from the Vera 
Institute as part of an effort by the state to reduce jail population. The program was extended to 
more defendants in more boroughs, yet the number of recommendations for ROR fell 
dramatically. This goes to highlight a fundamental barrier to broad based pretrial detention 
reform. No system makes definitive judgments about the characteristics of a defendant. 
However, if even one defendant deemed suitable for pretrial release were to reoffend, especially 
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in a violent or sensationalist manner, administrators worry that even one failure would be 
deemed a failure of the system as a whole by the public. Due to the fear of public backlash, the 
Office of Probation recommended fewer and fewer arrestees for ROR. This worry would appear 
to affect public administrators more than private ones, since the Vera Institute recommended 
many more arrestees than the Office of Probation, including famously, David Berkowitz, the 
“Son of Sam” serial killer. In fact, by 1970, judges were largely disregarding the Office of 
Probation’s recommendations; 32% of recommendations for ROR were granted while 28% of 
defendants not recommended for ROR by the Office of Probation were still granted ROR 
(Feeley, 2013). Since judicial officers must make a final determination, pretrial programs are 
only effective to the extent that risk reports are trusted by judicial officers and prescriptions 
made by pretrial services are followed. In 1973, the program was transferred back to control by 
the Vera Institute, this time with major funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration.  
 
In 1961, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
began studies that five years later would lead to major reform. Contemporaneous studies by 
Professor Caleb Foote uncovered many practices in violation of statue, last updated in 1789. 
Chief among them was the widespread use of bail for other purposes than to insure the presence 
of the individual at trial. Additionally, bail was set using schedules rather than individual 
assessment. Particularly disturbing to the Senate committee was the fact that many defendants 
were being detained for failure to pay what seemed like reasonable bail amounts. A report was 
completed in 1963 and submitted to the Justice Department. Upon receiving the report Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy instructed U.S. Attorneys “to take initiative in recommending the 
release of defendants on their own recognizance when they are satisfied that there is no 
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substantial risk of the defendants' failure to appear at the specified time and place." (Hearings on 
S. 1357). The following year, S. 2838, S. 2839 and S. 2840 were introduced on behalf of all 
members of the Judiciary committee (Ervin, 1967). The first bill mandated that no person was to 
be denied bail simply because they could not pay; it also established the presumption of 
eligibility for release. One of the bill’s authors explained: “Release on recognizance was not a 
new device by any means, but it was rarely used in practice.” “The object of S.2838 was to find 
some way to encourage the courts to utilize their existing authority” (Ervin, 1967). The second 
bill’s purpose was to increase the practice of crediting time spent in pretrial detention towards a 
defendant’s conviction. The final bill provided for a court-maintained bonding system as 
opposed to private bondsmen. This recommendation was not followed, but ultimately the 
principles underlying these bills were incorporated in the next session into S. 1357, the Omnibus 
Bail Reform Bill. Notably, the Bail Reform Bill intentionally avoided the topic of preventive 
detention. The Department of Justice concluded:  
Under all the circumstances, legislative authorization of preventive detention at this time 
seems unwarranted. Too much progress has been made and can be made within the 
framework of the techniques available under present law and the proposed conventional 
approach to risk the great uncertainties, legal and practical, which follow preventive 
detention (Hearings on S. 1357).  
 
Therefore, the 1966 Act can be viewed as granting non-capital defendants the statutory right to 
release. The financial resources of the defendant were allowed to be considered but “danger to 
the community” was not a permissible factor (Ervin, 1967).  
 
In the years to come legislative reluctance would prove to create problems because judges who 
wanted to detain seemingly dangerous defendants still had no choice but to set unreasonably high 
bail. The workaround devised by judges caused Congress to revisit bail reform in 1984. The 
1984 Bail Reform Act authorized the use of pretrial detention for defendants who “present a risk 
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of flight”. Additionally, judicial officers were permitted to consider “the nature and seriousness 
of the charges, the substantiality of the Government's evidence, the arrestee's background and 
characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by his release.” (1984 Act §§ 
3142(b), (c), (e), (f).).  
 
This Act faced a legal challenge when the Supreme Court heard United States v. Salerno. Lower 
courts ruled that the provision in the 1984 Bail Reform Act that granted judges the right to 
consider the future dangerousness of a defendant was an unconditional violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s substantive due process guarantee. The lower court ruling was reversed by the 
Supreme Court, who ruled that pretrial detention did not constitute punishment, rather it was “a 
potential solution to the pressing societal problem of crimes committed by persons on release” 
(481 U.S. 739 (1987)). This decision cemented the judicial implications of the 1984 Bail Reform 
Act, and to this day allows judges (and ARAI) to consider future dangerousness as part of a bail 
determination. 
 
During this period of reform, the Pretrial Services Act of 1982 was voted into law by voice vote 
in both houses of Congress. The Act provisioned for the hiring of pretrial services personnel for 
federal courts who were to “collect, verify, and report to the judicial officer, prior to the pretrial 
release hearing, information pertaining to the pretrial release of each individual charged with an 
offense...” (18 US.C §3154). In 2009, an actuarial instrument was developed which analyzed 
“number of prior felony convictions, number of prior failure- to-appears, pending charges, 
current offense type, current offense level, age at interview, highest educational level, 
employment status, home ownership, and substance use” to predict failure to appear and new 
criminal arrests (Lowenkamp, 2009).  
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Over 35 years after the federal courts extended pretrial services to all federal defendants, only 
seven states have adopted legislation that makes risk assessment available to all citizens.  
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Figure 1: Pretrial Detention Rate and Access to Risk Assessment by State 
 
 16 
While some states do offer partial coverage, broad-based access to risk assessment is not the 
norm in America. This chapter will investigate states’ relative unwillingness to adopt reforms 
similar to those in the federal system. To that end, I will show how pretrial decisions are made 
from both a legislative and bureaucratic perspective. Then, I will explain who makes pretrial 
decisions by showing how judicial officers, prosecutors and pretrial services offices operate to 
generate and utilize risk reports. Finally, I will explore how partisanship affects the pretrial 
decision-making process.  
 
Who Makes Decisions About Pretrial Policy? 
 
Some pretrial policy comes from new laws passed by the state legislature. States like New Jersey 
and California have captured headlines by instituting statewide reforms to their pretrial systems. 
These reforms deserve their own individual analysis, but notable in each case is the level of 
bipartisanship involved. In the case of New Jersey, Republican Governor Chris Christie was a 
key instigator in pressing for legislative action. The current chapter will seek to understand if 
conservative legislatures are less likely to pass reform than liberal legislatures, but there are 
many opportunities for ideology to seep into the criminal justice system below the legislative 
level in more complex ways.  
 
This study will focus on three main non-legislative actors: prosecutors, pretrial administrators 
and judges. While defense attorneys inevitably play a role in the process, a level of complexity 
can be removed from this analysis by regarding defense attorneys as always seeking the least 
restrictive pretrial agreement for their clients. However, it should be noted that defense attorneys, 
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especially public defenders, do affect the outcome insofar that they may not have adequate 
resources to zealously represent all clients, making plea deals more attractive.  
 
Each player in the justice system has some degree of latitude to adjust policy as they see fit. The 
Constitution as well as statutes narrow the range of acceptable policies and practices so that they 
must meet a certain threshold. Of course, the threshold set by the constitution or legislature is not 
always met. For example, a judge in New York who explained her bond decision making process 
as “you sit and you stare at the defendant, you get a sense that this defendant is just going to take 
a hike” (Dalakian, 2017) was found to be constitutionally out of line. Judges have a set of 
elements that are the only factors they may consider; the look or feel of the defendant is not one 
of them. In most cases, the constitutional threshold is not very restrictive at all, as most judges 
are not as forthcoming about their decision-making process as the judge in this example. 
Additionally, as described in the historical background, constitutional protections have been 
routinely ignored when they prove to be inconvenient. Before the reforms of 1984, judges 
routinely made bail determinations prohibitively high as an (unconstitutional) means of detaining 
dangerous defendants pretrial. Above the threshold exists a wide variety of practices. There is no 
constitutional right to risk assessment, so states must pass laws for risk assessment to be 
implemented. Zooming in, individual decision makers also play a role as they too are afforded 
latitude as long as their practices remain above the constitutional threshold.  
 
Prosecutors  
Perhaps the most important players in the pretrial system are prosecutors, who generally make 
bail recommendations to the judicial officer. As will be addressed in the Virginia case study, 
prosecutors also have the power to institute policy surrounding pretrial practices to the extent 
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that they can begin requesting lower bond amounts or increased ROR. Prosecutors are 
constrained by judicial officers, who must ultimately approve bail recommendations. However, 
prosecutors wield considerable power because it is unusual for a judge to revise a prosecutor’s 
bond recommendation upward. 
 
Judicial Officers 
Judicial officers include judges and magistrates (who often handle preliminary hearings). Judicial 
officers have the power to make final determinations of release conditions. These officers are 
bound by a number of factors. Legally, only a small number of factors that vary by state can be 
considered when assessing release or bail amount. Additionally, elected judges must be 
concerned with their public image. Judge Ronald Kessler explained judges’ concern with image 
in an article bluntly titled “I Set a Defendant Free And Got Blamed When He Raped Someone”. 
Kessler explains “Whenever a judge’s photograph appears on the front page along with a felon’s 
photo, it’s bad news” (2017). Elected judges like Kessler rationally seek to balance these 
concerns with constitutional obligations. Therefore, reliance on recommendations can vary 
dramatically. In speaking with judicial officers from multiple districts, most agreed that they did 
not pay attention to pretrial reports themselves and rather relied on prosecutors to factor in risk 
scores when making their recommendations.  
 
Additionally, in personal interviews, many judges have expressed that they put little to no weight 
into the consideration of pretrial services recommendations because they believe that the 
actuarial risk assessment does not or cannot consider factors that they deem important. One 
recurring theme was that actuarial risk assessment (in Virginia) does not take into account 
seriousness of the offense or weight of the evidence. Obviously, an actuarial tool cannot 
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accurately absorb subjective variables like the weight of the government’s evidence against a 
defendant and many of these factors need to be carefully considered by a judicial officer. 
However, I suggest that there is a separate issue at play with “seriousness of the crime”. The tool 
these judges were speaking about does add additional risk points if the crime the defendant is 
being accused of was felony drug, theft or fraud, but does not make any additional distinctions 
within those categories. Judges may be over-sensitive to the seriousness of the crime because 
small details that may not be relevant to an actuarial assessment could go to inflame the passions 
of the public if details were to be released. While there is no substitute for individualized 
assessment by judicial officers, factors that may distort the process such as these must be 
considered.  
 
Pretrial Services Offices 
In addition to generating risk reports, pretrial services offices provide the important service of 
enforcing conditions for release set by a judge. For example, a judge may instruct a defendant to 
physically check in to a pretrial services agency once a week to confirm they have not absconded 
or submit to drug testing. These agencies also often provide court date reminders in an effort to 
increase court attendance rate.  One federal judge called federal risk assessment (PTRA) “the 
best thing that ever happened to me”2. This judge was expressing his gratitude surrounding both 
risk assessment and pretrial supervision and how those additions changed the nature of 
generating release conditions by making him feel more comfortable releasing defendants.  
 
Pretrial administrators serve as a catch-all for recommendations made by evidence-based risk 
assessments. Administrators personally impact the system to the extent that they must obtain 
                                               
2 Interview notes on file with the author  
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grants or other sources of funding; but, for the purposes of the current study, there is no 
ideological influence ascribed to pretrial services offices themselves. In the same way that 
prosecutors’ power is dependent on the willingness of the judge to entertain changes in policy, 
the ability of pretrial reports to influence outcomes depends on judges’ willingness to take these 
reports into account when making a decision. Risk scores often face credibility challenges. 
Although the level of education varies by state, judges are generally not expected to know 
exactly how these models were created, or the underlying data that supports the validity of the 
model and therefore less likely to defer to the recommendation of a pretrial services agency. 
Alternatively, judges may be more willing to rely on their own experience than a model that has 
been validated using cases in aggregate or simply ideologically opposed to higher rates of ROR. 
 
How Are Pretrial Policy Decisions Made? 
 
Many scholars have investigated the proliferation of reform or lack thereof. Specifically, in the 
context of criminal procedure, Donald Dripps (1993) focuses on the failure of American 
legislatures to promulgate statutory rules of criminal procedure. Using public choice theory, 
Dripps constructs two possible reasons why legislatures may expand defendant protections. In 
one, legislatures will make new statutory rules to continue the use of a law enforcement method 
disallowed by the courts and only permitted if subjected to legislative constraints. An example is 
that legislatures are often unwilling to pay for the quality and quantity of public defense services 
required by the courts, so they write new statutes that provide more protections than previous 
statutes, but do not go as far as the judicial rulings. In the second, the method offends an interest 
group powerful enough to motivate the legislature. Dripps goes on to propose that benefits 
accrue to criminals and apparent criminals while costs accrue to members of the law enforcement 
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bureaucracy, giving opponents of reform more legitimacy and promoting the idea that the people 
who are most vulnerable are generally unorganized and politically uninterested (Dripps, 1993). 
However, this analysis, like many others, completely omits the role of partisanship. In Dripps’ 
view, legislatures are monolithic bodies trying to appease the same constituents.  
 
Dripps is critiqued by Walter B. Miller, who clarifies different archetypal ideological concerns 
for both Democrats and Republicans. Miller shows that Republicans have “crusading issues” 
such as rallying against excessive permissiveness, erosion of discipline and excessive leniency 
toward lawbreakers. While Democrats crusade over discriminatory bias, over-
institutionalization, and over-criminalization (Miller, 1973). These ideological positions imply 
that there should be at least some variance in lawmaker support for reform, regardless of the 
level of involvement of their constituents. Clearly, partisanship plays a role in the development 
of preferences concerning crime and law enforcement.  
 
To better understand how discretion is used by the various players in the system, it is instructive 
to draw links between the behavior of prosecutors and that of street-level bureaucrats; not only 
because of the large amount of literature on bureaucrat behavior, but because prosecutors 
experience largely the same forces. Lipsky (1983) defines street-level bureaucrats as those who 
work directly with members of the public. These bureaucrats are unelected (as are lower-level 
prosecutors) but may have elected managers. While many scholars do not classify  judicial 
officers as bureaucrats, Lipsky explains that in his typology, judges fit the description of a street-
level bureaucrat. Multiple researchers have undertaken careful studies to examine how these 
bureaucrats’ actions come to reflect the will of the people. Berkman and Plutzer (2010) propose 
three ways public school teachers’ decisions to teach evolution or intelligent design reflect the 
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partisanship of the local area. The question of how public opinion can percolate into bureaucratic 
or quasi-bureaucratic decision making is also important to this study. Accordingly, multiple links 
between Berkman and Plutzer’s study can be drawn to judicial decision making. The authors 
propose three factors that influence teachers, and each can be applied to prosecutors. They are: 
assortative hiring, pressure, and contextual effects.  
 
Assortative hiring is the process by which staff are recruited and retained. Simply put, if 
prosecutors are members of the community that they represent, they will be more likely than a 
random selection to share the community’s values and beliefs. Additionally, employees who do 
not feel that their work reflects their personal opinions about how policy should be carried out 
may be more likely to leave their job. Assortative hiring only increases representation to the 
extent that the employee opinion actually reflects the opinion of the community and is therefore 
the weakest of the three effects.  
 
In addition, pressure is directed at prosecutors through local advocacy groups and individuals 
who exert influence on prosecutorial decisions. Sabatier, Loomis and McCarthy (1995) show that 
interest groups are effective at influencing the operations of both elected officials and front-line 
employees; in this case, chief prosecutors and lower-level prosecutors respectively. The criminal 
justice landscape is filled with interest groups with strong positions on a multitude of different 
issues. Corporate groups such as the American Bail Coalition distribute funds to sympathetic 
politicians and mount legal challenges to new policies that decrease the usage of monetary 
release. Conversely, groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and the Pretrial Justice 
Institute lobby politicians to adopt practices that increase the usage of ROR. At the local level, 
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groups similarly attempt to influence decision making by both elected and unelected judicial 
actors.    
 
Meier and Rutherford summarize contextual effects succinctly by explaining: “Discretion is 
ubiquitous in bureaucracy… if bureaucrats exercise their discretion, it will reflect their own 
values” (2017). Bureaucratic discretion is often not malicious or even intentional; rather, legal 
mandates and duties are often ambiguous and require interpretation and implementation. 
Alternatively, evidence has been produced that local public employees may alter policy 
implementation to bring it into better alignment with what they see as the local sentiment or 
needs of the community (Percival, Johnson and Neiman 2009). Contextual effects can be a 
strong driver of variation in pretrial practices. One Virginia Commonwealth Attorney who was 
implementing the practice of never requesting monetary bail for low-level offenses explained 
that he had no political motivations; rather, he believed that this policy would best serve the 
citizens of his county. His sentiment perfectly reflects how the wide amount of latitude given to 
prosecutors can allow contextual effects to influence the way that policy is implemented.  
 
Some authors suggest that the acceptance of reforms “has more to do with the fame of symbolic 
politics… Judges and prosecutors have a common interest in avoiding responsibility for 
detaining people who cannot afford to post bond and for released defendants who subsequently 
fail to appear in court” (Feeley, 1983). Under Feeley’s conception, reform is attractive because 
both prosecutors and judges can point to the pretrial services office as the malefactor when there 
is a failure in the system.  
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The teacher-prosecutor/judge metaphor can be extended further when professional opinion is 
taken into consideration. Berkman and Plutzer note that virtually every biologist and academic 
group strongly support the teaching of evolution in the classroom, this however is sharply 
contrasted with a populace that largely prefers the teaching of both evolution and intelligent 
design. In terms of pretrial policy, the National Association of Counties, the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, numerous prosecutors’ associations and the American Civil 
Liberties Union all have voiced support for reforms that emphasize ROR. Their support is 
doubly notable because of the diverse ideological alignments of the supportive groups. This 
suggests that among criminal justice professionals, there exists at least some degree of agreement 
on reform proposals, which can be contrasted with divergent public opinion. Going forward, it 
will be important to understand how actors may respond differently to elite and mass pressure.  
 
There are notable differences between the behavior of teachers and participants in the justice 
system. Firstly, prosecutors generally face more electoral pressure than teachers because both 
judges and top-level prosecutors are directly elected. Additionally, public opinion of pretrial 
policy is much less solidified than that of teaching evolution. Prosecutors and judges therefore 
experience much less mass pressure and therefore must act in a way that they think comports 
with mass opinion without being as assured as public-school teachers can be.  
 
While bureaucrats are free to exercise their discretion, legislators typically are viewed as 
responsible for representing the will of the people, at least to the extent that it is a path to 
reelection. Arnold (1992) provides a useful framework for understanding issues that generally do 
not capture the public’s attention by dividing any legislator’s constituents into attentive and 
inattentive publics. The preferences of attentive publics, usually interest groups or people who 
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stand to be directly impacted by a policy, are easy to understand but must be weighed against 
those of the inattentive publics. More specifically, they must be weighed against the anticipated 
preferences of the inattentive publics were they to become mobilized on a specific issue. 
Inattentive publics present the challenge of understanding and anticipating non-disclosed public 
opinion. Legislators must therefore “estimate three things: the probability that an opinion might 
be aroused, the shape of that opinion and its potential for electoral consequences” (Arnold, 
1992). Arnold’s framework will help to explain how conservative public opinion in general 
could go to influence specific policies. For instance, if legislators believe that if reform were 
passed then their constituents would be mobilized against reform, this could present a 
mechanism by which conservative mass opinion influences pretrial policy.  
 
Examining State Variance in Pretrial Services  
 
Considering the multitude of factors outlined above, it is no surprise that a tremendous variety of 
pretrial processes and outcomes currently exist in the US. At the federal level, all defendants 
have pretrial risk assessment available to them. However, in state courts, only 25% of people live 
in a county that provides evidence-based pretrial risk assessment (PJI, 2017). Some states, like 
New Jersey and Kentucky, have mandated pretrial risk assessment in every county. Others, like 
Virginia, provide some funding to county pretrial programs but do not have a uniform 
mechanism for instituting statewide reform. Twenty-two other states do not employ pretrial risk 
assessment in any county.  
 
Each reform tells a story. Politicians, activists, prosecutors and judges all across the country have 
fought for a system they see as more equitable. By looking at the variation in the percentage of 
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the population in each state with access to validated risk assessment, this allows us to understand 
trends and factors that may influence the development of reform.  
 
Sample and Measures  
 
In the case of pretrial reform, public opinion has not been aroused in similar ways to many of the 
example policies like teaching evolution. However, there are many issues that share this quality. 
Therefore, rather than explicit incorporation of public opinion, for example, people calling their 
representatives to urge them to support reform, public opinion becomes reflected in policy 
through multiple complex processes.  
 
Erickson, Wright and McIver (1993) explain the prevailing scholarly viewpoint as “because state 
politics is beyond the attention of most citizens most of the time, there is little reason to expect 
state policies to reflect public preferences”. In this line of thought, Jack Treadway explains the 
lack of congruence between policy outputs as the result of uninformed voters, inability of voters 
to communicate preferences to politicians, apathy towards public preferences on the part of 
public officials and voter ignorance regarding their preferences actually being represented or not 
(1985). Erickson, Wight and McIver offer a rebuke to Treadway’s argument and clearly establish 
the association between the state’s general political attitude and policy enacted in that state 
through pooling survey data. They show that “state electorates control the ideological tone of the 
state policy by rewarding the state parties closest to their own ideological views and party 
control does have policy effects…” (Erickson, Wright and McIver, 1993). 
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Additionally, Weber and Shaffer (1972) show that policies enacted by state legislatures closely 
mirror the public opinion in that state. In fact, they find that measures of public opinion are more 
useful in predicting policy outcomes than characteristics of the state political system and socio-
economic measures. Their findings lend credence to the claim that variation in state level pretrial 
policy is in part due to differences in ideology.  
 
This analysis will compare access to pretrial across states that vary with respect to their partisan 
makeup, to understand the observed variation in pretrial policy. For the state-level analysis, the 
dependent variable used is the percentage of population that has access to validated risk 
assessment as measured by the Pretrial Justice Institute in 2017. The independent variables used 
are listed below: 
Table 1: Independent Variables Used for Analysis 
  
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
  
Coverage Percentage of state population with access to validated risk 
assessment  
Trump State vote share of Donald Trump for 2016 presidential election 
Population State population in millions as measured by 2016 census 
estimates 
Incarceration Pretrial incarceration rate per 10,000 residents 
hou_chamber State House Ideological Median. Scale is -1 (Liberal) to +1 
(Conservative) 
sen_chamber State Senate Ideological Median. Scale is -1 (Liberal) to +1 
(Conservative). 
ranney_control Five-Year Average (2012-2017) of variables for Proportion of 
Democratic Control in State Senate, House, Governor’s Office, 
and overall Government 
  
 
 
The measures sen_chamber and hou_chamber are measures of partisanship for States’ House and 
Senate bodies in 2016 as measured by Shor and McCarty in The Ideological Mapping of 
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American Legislatures (2011). The final measure of partisanship is the Ranney Index for party 
control as calculated by Gray, Hanson and Kousser (2017). The Ranney Index combines the 
average party vote for Governor, percent of seats held in each house of the legislature and how 
each party stood in terms of control of the combination of governor and two legislative 
chambers.  The index takes in to account the period from 2012 to 2017 and looks at all the 
elections during that time to produce a state number from 1.000 (perfect Democratic control) to 
0.000 (perfect Republican control). Additional information about demographic factors and the 
share of the population that voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election are also 
included. 
 
Based upon this discussion, two hypotheses are generated that I test in the empirical analysis 
below: 
H1A: States that show stronger support for Donald Trump will be less likely to have access to 
Pretrial services.  
H1B: States with Republican controlled governments will be less likely to have access to Pretrial 
services.  
 
Methods  
 
To estimate the effect of partisanship on the availability of pretrial services, an ordinary least 
squares regression is used. A concern with this method is that multicollinearity between 
partisanship measures could produce incorrect standard errors or produce coefficients with 
incorrect signs so three models will be used, each with only one partisanship measure: Trump 
vote percentage, Senate partisanship, House partisanship and Ranney Control Index.  
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Table 2: OLS Regression Examining Converge on Multiple Dimensions of Partisanship 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Trump Vote House 
Partisanship 
Senate 
Partisanship 
Party 
Control 
Full Model 
      
Population (millions) -0.0103 -0.00613 -0.00426 -0.00559 -.0000000142** 
 (0.00736) (0.00689) (0.00697) (0.00718) (6.93e-09) 
Incarceration Rate 0.00591 -0.00154 -0.00527 0.00213 0.00394 
 (0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0122) (0.0109) 
Trump Vote  -1.744***    -2.644*** 
 (0.588)    (0.894) 
House Partisanship  -0.220**   -0.133 
  (0.0841)   (0.138) 
Senate Partisanship   -0.169**  0.0948 
   (0.0819)  (0.143) 
Partisan Control    0.796** -0.300 
    (0.335) (0.635) 
Constant 1.136*** 0.405** 0.412** -0.0677 1.790*** 
 (0.279) (0.159) (0.162) (0.264) (0.639) 
      
Observations 49 44 45 49 44 
R-squared 0.183 0.175 0.124 0.132 0.341 
      
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Below are the elasticities for each measure of partisanship these measures show the percent 
change in coverage for a one percent change in each measure of partisanship for each 
partisanship variable in the individual models 1-4. 
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Table 3: Elasticities for Measures of Partisanship 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Elasticity 
  
Ranney Control  1.276** 
Index (0.587) 
House Partisanship -0.299** 
 (0.128) 
Senate Partisanship -0.212* 
 (0.111) 
Trump Vote -3.139** 
 (1.198) 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results 
 
The first regression shows that a 1% increase in vote share for Trump corresponds with a 3.139% 
decrease in the predicted population with access to validated pretrial assessment. This estimate is 
larger than the corresponding estimates for party control, House, and Senate partisanship. Where 
the Senate effect is a .212% decrease in access to risk assessment and the House effect is a 
.299% decrease. The effect of a 1% increase in Democratic Party control corresponds with a 
1.276 percentage point increase in risk assessment. The variables for incarceration rate and 
population control for these factors but are not significant to the model. This is likely influenced 
by the small sample size. These findings comport with both hypotheses outlined above. 
 
Additionally, the finding of significance for the Trump vote variables robustness is bolstered by 
the fact that even in the full model, where multicollinearity is present3, significance is found. 
This further shows that missing variable bias is minimized.  
                                               
3 Partisanship variables are correlated with each other with coefficients around .8  
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Discussion   
 
If partisan preference had no impact on the presence of criminal justice reform, then one would 
expect to see small estimates for all four partisanship measures. However, this is not the case.  
 
Three measures of party control all show that increased Republican control yields decrease 
access to pretrial services. If pretrial reform were simply a bureaucratic phenomenon, measures 
of party control should not have such a strong impact on pretrial services. It remains possible that 
bureaucratic decision making is tapping in to some underlying conservative public opinion, 
which is correlated with more conservative legislatures through the processes of assortative 
hiring, pressure and contextual effects discussed above. However, given the power of legislatures 
to influence pretrial reform, perhaps the relationship is more direct. The next chapter will explore 
reform in Virginia and attempt to descriptively show how bureaucrats and legislators share 
power. 
 
Still, the largest effect and determinate of access to pretrial services is the percentage of Trump 
voters. The most simplistic answer is to show that more conservative legislatures are less likely 
to enact reform. This itself is interesting because these specific pretrial reforms generally are not 
included in party platforms and have not been previously conceived as a partisan issue. In this 
view, partisanship is simply a rudimentary proxy for public opinion concerning pretrial reform. 
Accordingly, one would expect to see significance for those ideology variables. This is a sensible 
conclusion; Republican opposition to pretrial reform is likely borne out of an opposition to 
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expansion of government bureaucracy rather than fiscal concerns.  This analysis supports that 
conclusion but could be taken a step further. 
 
It appears that support for Trump has an effect on risk assessment coverage above and beyond its 
effect on the ideological makeup of legislatures due to the large difference in the effect of the 
partisanship variables and the effect of the Trump vote variable. This finding aligns with the 
theoretical findings of scholars who emphasize the role of partisanship in the construction of 
preferences surrounding criminal justice.  
 
While the exact mechanism remains undetermined, it is clear that these preferences are not solely 
being expressed through the election of state representatives. Instead, the ideology of Trump 
voters likely permeates through bureaucratic positions responsible for the enactment of reforms 
like risk assessment. What is this ideology and what are its links to pretrial policy? Trump vote 
in the current study is used as a rudimentary proxy for the partisanship of the public, but it is 
potentially capturing much more. Trump voters have been shown to be disproportionately from 
rural areas (Monnatt and Brown, 2017) and place high on measures of racial resentment (Sides, 
Tesler, and Vavreck, 2017). Surely, these factors could be correlated with opinion about pretrial 
reform. However, due to the limited awareness of pretrial reform, these factors more likely serve 
as a signal to both elected representatives and bureaucrats as to the response the public would 
have if public opinion were to be mobilized in the way described by Arnold.    
 
 These results beg the question of how these preferences are being expressed. Most voters are 
blissfully unaware of the minutiae of criminal procedure. The most likely answer is that any 
publicity would likely be due to a high-profile re-offense and politicians prevent that negative 
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publicity by maintaining the status quo. To be sure, implementing reform is politically risky, but 
parties approach the issue in very different ways with Republicans showing much more 
reluctance, especially in deep red states with many Trump voters. But we should avoid the 
narrative that pretrial reform is a Democratic issue because statutes have gone into place through 
the work of Republican legislatures all around the country in states like Kentucky and South 
Dakota and deep blue states like Vermont and Massachusetts remain without any risk 
assessment. These findings have meaningful implications for activists and legislators who seek 
to implement reforms and points to the importance of voter preference for non-electoral issues. 
 
The findings shown here go to show that a single, homogenous set of Republican values 
regarding criminal procedure reform does not exist. Rather, there is some unique facet of Trump 
support that compels politicians to resist promulgating reform. To help answer the question of 
why, this paper will examine a state with large amounts of variation in availability of pretrial 
services from county to county: Virginia. An in-depth analysis of these states will further explore 
the link between pretrial reform and ideology with a more granular focus on individual decision 
makers.  
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Chapter 2: The Pretrial System in Virginia 
 
 
Among the nationwide reformist energy surrounding pretrial reform, Virginia lies squarely in the 
middle on most metrics. This makes Virginia particularly apt for the study of pretrial reform. The 
study of pretrial services began in Virginia in 1989, pursuant to authorizing language in the 
Appropriations Act of that year. In 1995, pretrial services were authorized to begin operation by 
statute with the passage of the Pretrial Services Act, which also called for the creation of a risk 
assessment instrument. (§19.2-152.2 Code of Virginia). To construct the instrument, data 
collection took place from 1996 to 1999, and the instrument now known as the Virginia Pretrial 
Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) implemented in 2005 (Rose, 2016).  
 
It is worthwhile to discuss in detail the way that actuarial risk assessment instruments (ARAI), 
and specifically the VPRAI, are constructed as a way of contrasting actuarial risk assessment 
with the current practice of clinical assessment by judicial officers. First, the VPRAI must be put 
into context with the larger discussion of actuarial risk assessment instruments in general. “Risk 
assessment” is a broad term and ARAIs are used in many contexts beyond pretrial. The entire 
pretrial process is, at its heart, risk assessment. Whether it is a judge or an actuarial model, each 
must use available information to make a determination about the risk inherent in any individual 
defendant. Accordingly, the term “risk assessment” is insufficient to describe the ARAI because 
risk assessment may be clinical, meaning it is done by a judicial officer or actuarial, thus 
produced by an actuarial model.  
 
Actuarial risk assessment instruments have enjoyed widespread acceptance for a reason, they 
promise to improve the current functioning of the criminal justice system in a variety of ways. 
One benefit of using ARAI in tandem with clinical assessment is the potential of actuarial 
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assessments to be calibrated. A judicial officer may have an idea of why some defendants are 
more dangerous than others, but an ARAI can give a specific percentage prediction, allowing 
judicial officers and policymakers to decide what constitutes acceptable risk. A 2012 study 
examining 116,000 defendants over a 16-year period showed that defendants with a 30 percent 
or less chance of re-offense constituted 85 percent of the pretrial population and that releasing 
defendants who met this bar would have resulted in significantly more releases than actually took 
place (Baradaran and McIntyre, 2011). Thirty percent may not be the preferred level, but it goes 
to show that setting a calculable risk level could not only improve equity in the pretrial process, 
but potentially aid the presumption of release. 
 
ARAI may also be able to alleviate current socio-economic inequities if it can allow judicial 
officers to calibrate their decision making in such a way that increases ROR. In a randomized 
trial by the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), judges who were informed 
by Virginia’s updated risk assessment tool were 1.9 times more likely to offer a defendant non-
monetary release. Additionally, judges’ decisions to release defendants on nonfinancial 
conditions increased 8.8 times when pretrial officers recommend release, when controlling for 
risk level, charge category, and demographic characteristics (Rose, 2016).  
 
Critiques of ARAI  
 
A common criticism of ARAI is the lack of individualized assessment. Because models compare 
defendants to population means rather than examine the defendant’s behavior itself, some critics 
argue that models fail to take into account certain immeasurable qualities and therefore deprive 
defendants of their constitutional protections. For example, a common parable is that of the 
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defendant with a broken leg which proves he was unable to have committed the crime he is 
accused of, even though an actuarial model indicates otherwise. However, as Dalakan argues, 
“judges are just as likely to ‘rely on irrelevant factors or to include appropriate factors 
incorrectly’” than they are to be able to incorporate some sort of other unique factor (2017). In 
fact, concerning the earlier parable, Pfaff writes “For every case where the human sees the 
broken leg and makes a better call there is more than one case in which the human takes into 
account something irrelevant that the model ignores and thus reaches a worse conclusion.” 
(2015).  
 
An even more common argument is that actuarial models will exacerbate racial disparities 
already present in the justice system. Sonia Starr predicts that ARAI “can be expected to 
contribute to the concentration of the criminal justice system’s punitive impact among those who 
already disproportionately bear its brunt, including people of color. . . Group-based 
generalizations about dangerousness have an insidious history in our culture” (2014). While few 
models explicitly use race, gender or national origin, many do include things like criminal 
history, zip code or housing status, which can be strongly correlated to race. These factors could 
serve to induce a disparate impact by predicting more danger for black or poor defendants. These 
arguments are valid and made in good faith, however they neglect the present reality of judicial 
discretion. Judges also consider criminal history and housing status, along with a host of other 
factors that are unknown or unknowable. Any bias introduced by these variables into an actuarial 
model would also be contained within a clinical assessment.  
 
Another consideration is labeling. Pfaff notes that “For example, while men are more likely to 
commit crimes than women, most men will not commit crimes. But including ‘male’ as a risk 
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factor could encourage people to view all men as risky.” (2015). This delves into an interesting 
sociological argument; Pfaff writes that critics of ARAI may say “while judges may rely on 
impermissible factors, it may be less harmful for judges to use them less accurately but less 
explicitly”. Therefore, while the addition of some factors may in fact improve the accuracy of 
some model, collateral damage like the creation of negative associations or stereotypes should 
also be considered.   
 
There is also a methodological argument to be made against ARAI, especially in regard to the 
synthesis of ARAI and artificial intelligence. In his book Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing 
and Punishing in an Actuarial Age, Bernard Harourt warns of the possibility of actuarial models 
informing criminal behavior. Specifically, if a person is aware of the factors that contribute to 
higher risk scores, she may behave in such a way to manipulate the scores to avoid detection or 
to seem less risky than is actually the case. Overreliance on models could cause criminal justice 
systems to focus too much on risky defendants who are risky because of factors included in the 
model while ignoring defendants who are risky for unknown reasons or because of random 
chance. Harcourt’s argument is credible in that models should avoid myopia and creating 
groupings of people who fit the typology of a criminal. However, these conclusions have limited 
applicability to pretrial risk assessment specifically. This is because the factors used in pretrial 
risk assessment are, for the most part, immutable, and those that can be manipulated are factors 
such as criminal record, drug abuse and past failure to appear. Surely a defendant who purposely 
avoids a criminal record or drug abuse would be considered a success story rather than someone 
manipulating the system.  
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Perhaps the most pressing issue affecting the fidelity of ARAIs is non-representative data. 
Ezekiel Edwards of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) explains, “Algorithms and 
predictive tools are only as good as the data that’s fed into them . . .Much of that data is created 
by man, and that data is infused with bias.” (Simonite, 2017). Because these models rely on 
regression to produce risk scores, basic assumptions about the data must be satisfied for risk 
scores to be representative of the population as a whole. Many models rely on past arrests as a 
proxy for criminal behavior, however this relationship can break down if, for example, African 
Americans are arrested at a higher rate than Whites while the base crime rate is comparable.  
 
In 2009, the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) went through validation and 
further implementation becoming the first research-based pretrial risk assessment to be deployed 
on a large scale. Despite its name, the VPRAI is used in at least one jurisdiction in four states 
(Florida, Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia). The VPRAI weighs the criminal, appearance, drug 
and employment history of the defendant to sort defendants into six levels based on risk 
(VanNostrand, Rose & Weibrecht, 2011). The tool has been shown to be an effective predictor 
and race neutral.  
 
The risk assessment consists of eight factors including measures of the following: (1) current 
charge, (2) pending charges, (3) criminal history, (4) failure to appear, (5) violent convictions, 
(6) length at residence, (7) employment/primary caregiver, and (8) history of drug abuse. The 
eight factors are weighted to create a risk score and defendants are assigned to one of six risk 
levels ranging from low to high (VanNostrand, Rose & Weibrecht, 2011).  
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The category current charge reflects the fact that defendants charged with a felony are more 
likely to fail (failure to appear, re-offense, or violate terms of pretrial) than those charged with a 
misdemeanor. Similarly, defendants who were on release when they allegedly committed a new 
offense are more likely to fail. The criminal history is included because defendants with one or 
more adult criminal conviction fail at a higher rate. More than two thirds of all defendants have 
at least one previous conviction. If a defendant has failed to appear in court two or more times 
this adds to their risk score. However, only five percent of defendants have failed to appear two 
or more times.  Risk assessment defines violent convictions as “any act that causes or intends to 
cause physical injury to another person and includes felony and misdemeanor violent 
convictions”. This case increases the risk of a defendant. Defendants who  lived at their current 
residence for less than one year are more likely to fail pending trial compared to defendants who 
lived at their residence for one year or more.  
 
Defendants who did not maintain continuous employment at one or more jobs prior to their 
arrest, or were not a primary caregiver, are more likely to fail than defendants who were 
employed or a primary caregiver at the time of their arrest. Defendants with a history of drug 
abuse were shown to be more likely to fail than those without a history of drug abuse. DCJS 
defines drug abuse to include any illegal or prescription drugs. More than one-third (36.3%) of 
defendants were determined to have a history of drug abuse while the remaining 63.7% of the 
defendants were determined not to have a history of drug abuse. 
 
Each of these factors are binary but are weighted differently to reflect various levels of 
importance. Factors with the weight of one are: Failure to appear, violent convictions and 
employment. Pending charges, criminal history and drug abuse have a weight of two and felony 
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charge has a weight of three. These add to a total possible risk score of 14. Pretrial services 
divides risk scores in to six categories, shown in figure 1 with the percentage of defendants who 
fall into each category.  
 
Table 4: Failure Rate by Risk Level in Virginia4 
 (1) (2) (3) 
RISK LEVEL SCORE TOTAL % ANY FAILURE % 
    
1 0-2 21.8 6.1 
2 3-4 22.9 9.8 
3 5-6 22.8 14.9 
4 7-8 19.5 21.4 
5 9-10 10.0 29.3 
6 11-14 3.0 37.1 
    
 
 
In Virginia, these pitfalls have been mostly mitigated through careful selection of variables that 
are being considered. In 2009, when the VPRAI was revised, a study was presented showing the 
new factors of race and gender were neutral. First, it showed that whites and non-whites fail 
pretrial at the same rate (15.2% and 15.3%, respectively). However, separate multivariate 
regressions for whites and people of color show that the factors that contribute to the VPRAI 
model do have a stronger predictive ability for whites than people of color. The difference 
between these two models is also statistically significant5. The authors of this model solve the 
problem of racial differences in their models by weighting, summing and collapsing risk scores 
into the six categories discussed above. After this, the difference is no longer statistically 
significant6. Considered in total, these discrepancies do weaken the model, and go to reinforce 
                                               
4 Source: Virginia DCJS, 2017 
5 p=.002 
6 p=.332 
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the fact that while risk categories do come from precise predictions, these precise predictions 
cannot be utilized because of their bias.  
 
It is important to emphasize the fluid nature of actuarial models. Sample populations and risk 
coefficients must be continuously validated and updated for these tools to remain valid and avoid 
the worst of the collateral damage that ARAI are capable of. 
 
Pretrial Reform in Virginia 
 
While the creation and implementation of VRPAI was a major step for pretrial reform, recent 
reformist energy has been focused on a primary goal of pretrial services: the presumption of 
release. Some reformers have gone further than the creation of pretrial services offices to expand 
their efforts to include the elimination of the practice of monetary bail. The elimination of 
monetary bail is related to pretrial services to the extent that pretrial supervision is often seen as 
a replacement for the supervision and assurances given by bail bondsmen.  
 
In January of 2019, Alexandria City Commonwealth Attorney Bryan Porter announced that he 
was instituting a new departmental policy of suggesting that defendants charged with 
misdemeanors be released on ROR with pretrial supervision. In this, he joined prosecutors in 
Richmond, Chesterfield and Arlington and a judge in Fairfax, all of whom have committed to 
similar policies. In Virginia, the practice of prosecutors initiating reform is relatively new. In 
April of 2018 the commonwealth’s Attorney for Richmond announced the first departmental 
policy on pretrial. This policy included mandatory ROR for misdemeanors, but also mandated 
that prosecutors can only request detention if they can show that a defendant is dangerous. The 
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new policy is more restrictive than the current policy because statute provides for detention of 
defendants based on dangerousness or suspicion of absconding. Notably, the Richmond reforms 
also included a blanket ban on requesting monetary bail. To formulate these policies, Virginia 
Attorney General Mark Herring relied in part on his personal experience. In an interview he said, 
“when I was a junior commonwealth’s attorney and the judge looked down at me and said, ‘Mr. 
Herring, what’s your recommendation on bond?’ I literally pulled it out of my ass,” he says. “I’d 
think, ‘OK, it’s a felony, seems like it ought to be four figures, $3,500 sounds right’” (Oliver, 
2019). In this situation, Mr. Herring was one of the clinicians taking part in a clinical risk 
assessment. His comments go to show that often the authors of these bail terms do not have the 
information, time or capability to accurately and fairly assess all of the factors that must be taken 
into consideration. Mr. Herring took these limitations to be a compelling reason to put in place 
reforms that would restrict the acceptable range of prosecutorial and judicial decision making.   
 
Returning to the model discussed in the previous section is helpful for understanding these 
reforms. The statutes of Virginia allow for a large degree of judicial and prosecutorial discretion. 
However, decisions by actors restrict the range of acceptable behavior further by imposing 
institutional rules. In the case of Commonwealth’s Attorneys, these actors are elected 
representatives who campaign explicitly on issues of reform in criminal justice. While few 
legislators stake out positions on specific reforms, the actions of these prosecutors may give us a 
clearer view into the partisan flavor of reform efforts.  
 
To that end, it is worth noting that each of the commonwealth’s attorneys who have instituted 
reforms mentioned above are members of the Democratic party. As of February 2019, these four 
 43 
prosecutors represent the only prosecutors who have instituted departmental bans on pretrial 
detention.  
 
This raises an important question: can prosecutorial discretion serve as a model for reform going 
forward? Wright shows that in 85% of prosecutor general elections analyzed, the incumbent ran 
unopposed and the incumbent won 95% of the time (2009). Additionally, by drawing on a 
database of debate topics, Wright argues that even when an incumbent is challenged, chief 
prosecutor debates usually focus around single events or defendants that are viewed as failures 
by the incumbent rather than systemic change. These challenges cast doubt on the likelihood of a 
broad-based reform taking place purely by electing reformist prosecutors.  
 
Reforms like the ones discussed above are, for the most part, too specific to be captured in the 
models used in this study which examine funding level and presence of pretrial services. 
Regardless, these stories help us to understand why counties with a more conservative voting 
population may be less likely to see the benefits of reform.  
 
Examining Variance in Virginia  
 
Virginia is divided into 95 counties and 38 independent (not included in a county) cities. Because 
the census regards cities as county-equivalents, I will use the term locality to refer to either 
counties or cities. 85.3% of Virginia citizens have access to validated risk assessment, which is 
administered by one of thirty-three offices (PJI, 2016). Virginians who do not have access to risk 
assessment are in that position because they live in one of the 33 localities not served by a 
pretrial services office. Figure one shows counties that do not have pretrial services in white.  
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Figure 2: Virginia Pretrial Services Availability by County  
 
 
 
One pretrial services office often serves multiple localities, areas without risk assessment are 
generally geographically clustered. Additionally, they have the common trait of having lower 
population density. Localities without pretrial services have a median population of 18,236, 
whereas counties with pretrial services have a median population of 23,185. 
 
Because of the skewed distribution of pretrial offices, meaning that most counties do have 
pretrial services and the tendency for offices to serve high population areas, there is no clear 
relationship between the ideological makeup of a locality and the mere presence of pretrial 
services. This is likely due to the number of confounding factors. Demographic factors as well as 
local crime rates could all impact the demand for pretrial services. However, offices and 
localities vary greatly with respect to the level of funding and number of referrals, which could 
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be impacted by partisan factors due to the nature of the discretion exercised by elected county 
officials as well as bureaucrats involved in the system.  
 
Currently, 63% of the funding for pretrial services comes from the state of Virginia. The 
remaining share is paid by the localities using the pretrial services office. State funding is 
distributed by the Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) as a grant. Grants are 
distributed through biennial appropriations from the General Assembly of Virginia. These 
continuation grants are only available to localities that have previously received funding from the 
DCJS. These funds are generally granted in a consistent way and are only revised if there is a 
performance problem in the locality requesting the funds. Increases in these funds generally arise 
only if there is a new jail construction project. This occurred most recently in 2012 when the 
Southwest Regional Jail was built, and funding was provided to expand pretrial services to the 
residents of that area. In 2016, the General Assembly provided additional appropriations for the 
expansion of pretrial services to areas previously unserved. Only 15 out of 33 unserved localities 
applied for the new funding, indicating a mixed desire to expand pretrial services. Funding for 
this grant was competitive due to the large amount of interest and small amount of funding and 
after counties were selected to receive the grant, there was a budget shortfall and the House of 
Delegates cut the program entirely resulting in a total lack of expansion.  
 
Given these factors, two hypotheses will be tested by this analysis: 
H2: Localities in Virginia with larger Republican constituencies will be less likely to have a 
pretrial services office. 
H3: Out of the localities that do have pretrial services, those with larger Republican 
constituencies will receive less funding in total. 
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Sample and Measures 
 
To analyze variance in funding for pretrial services, I will primarily rely on DCJS reports of 
pretrial services offices’ performance. These reports summarize levels of state and local funding 
as well as caseload for fiscal year 2018. Culpeper County is omitted from these measures 
because they did not report their caseload or funding to the DCJS as they are entirely funded by 
Culpeper County. Therefore, there are 32 pretrial service offices included in this study. There are 
an additional 32 localities that do not have pretrial services, which are included in the dataset as 
censored observations with values of zero for funding and caseload. These measures are merged 
with demographic information in counties including the population and percentage of residents 
who identified to the Census as Black. While the population of each county or district is 
potentially explanatory, it is omitted from this model due to excessive correlation with the 
caseload of each district. This variable is preferable because it not only captures the demand in 
the district (which population would) but it also captures the actual work being done by each 
office.  
 
Methods 
 
First, a maximum likelihood, binary choice model will be used with a dependent variable of 1 if 
the county has pretrial services and 0 if not7. The next task is to model funding that is received 
by localities or groups of localities cooperating. To do this, the localities that do not have a 
pretrial services office are treated as left-censored observations because their true willingness to 
                                               
7 Probit and logit models were compared using the Akaike Information Criterion calculated as -2ln(L)+2K. For this 
specific set of data, the AIC was lower for the logit model, meaning that the logit model was a better fit for the data. 
 47 
accept pretrial services may not be zero. Rather, some counties may in fact be willing to give 
money to avoid implementing pretrial services. Because of the presence of censored 
observations, a Tobit regression is used for the first analysis. This method has been validated in 
similarly studies where is has been shown that this regression can be reliably applied when 
datasets are censored (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980).  
 
There are analytical limitations in the available dataset. Perhaps most importantly, there is a 
possible simultaneity problem with using the number of investigations as an independent 
variable because it is possible that funding impacts number of investigations which in turn 
affects funding. Unfortunately, the number of investigations is important to this model because it 
serves as a main control for the actual work being done by the office, additionally, these 
measures were collected for the first time in 2018, eliminating the possibility of using lagged 
variables8.  
 
Further, a multi-state sample could improve issues related small sample sizes but would need to 
be carefully specified to avoid issues arising from the fact that there may be unobservable 
political or bureaucratic realities in different states. 
 
Results 
 
First, a logit model is used to model the decision to have a pretrial services office or not. There 
are certain limits on this model, primarily because, in most cases, localities that do not have 
pretrial services are being compared to groups of localities that do. For that reason, it is not 
                                               
8 As these measures were collected as part of an ongoing study by the Virginia DCJS, in the future, lagged variables 
will be available. 
 48 
viable to compare population, and caseload cannot be compared because counties without 
pretrial services have no caseload. Even given these limitations, the statistically significant and 
negative effect of GOP votes is notable because it goes to show that counties higher percentages 
of GOP voters are less likely to have a pretrial services office.  
 
Table 5: Binary Choice Model for Pretrial Services Office  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Logit 
Coefficient 
Odds ratio Marginal effects9 
    
Pretrial services    
    
GOP Vote  -9.037*** 0.000119*** -1.708*** 
Percentage (2.768) (0.000329) (0.344) 
Black Percentage -2.822 0.0595 -0.533 
 (2.304) (0.137) (0.419) 
Constant 5.426*** 227.2***  
 (1.861) (422.9)  
    
Observations 64 64 64 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Because the marginal effect is negative and statistically significant, this shows that counties with 
higher proportions of Republican voters are less likely to have pretrial services.  
 
Next, to calculate a model to understand the level of funding provided to the various localities in 
Virginia. Consistent Tobit expected values can be calculated where 0 is the censoring point 
(McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). This formula can be used to create a model where GOP vote 
percentage, African American percentage, number of investigations and the presence of a city 
                                               
9 These are elasticities calculated by calculating the elasticity for each observation then averaging to produces the 
sample elasticity. Since this is a linear model, this is equivalent to calculating E[y] for an average case and these 
coeffects show how the model would change at the sample means.  
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(either a city is contained in the pretrial district or the city itself does not have pretrial services) 
are used as explanatory variable. Below is the Tobit regression using annual funding in 
thousands of dollars as the dependent variable: 
 
Table 6: Tobit Regression of Presence of Pretrial Services 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tobit Elasticities 
   
GOP Vote Percentage  -350.9** -.7170565** 
 (156.3) (.32402) 
Percent Black Population -313.1** -.2576817** 
 (137.6) (.11488) 
Investigations 0.301*** .7061435*** 
 (0.0216) (.07391) 
Presence of City  65.40 .1118022 
 (44.10) (.07586) 
var(e.funding) 24,189***  
 (4,276)  
Constant 296.1**  
 (112.2)  
   
Observations 64 64 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
From this analysis, we can see that the percentage of people in a county who voted for Donald 
Trump in the 2016 presidential election has a large, negative and statistically significant effect on 
the amount of funding a pretrial office receives even after controlling for the amount of work the 
agency is doing. The number of investigations does indeed have a large t-score indicating the 
number of investigations plays a large role in the funding of an office. Calculating the elasticity 
of the independent variables will show what percentage change in funding is caused by a 1% 
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change in each independent variable10. The elasticities for each independent variable are listed in 
the second column of the chart above. For every 1% increase in Republican vote share, this 
model predicts a .71% decrease in funding.  
 
Discussion 
 
These results are consistent with the theoretical foundations laid out in this chapter as well as the 
regressions performed at the statewide level in the previous chapter. This result adds credence to 
the claim that Republican consistencies are an obstacle to pretrial reform even when controlling 
the caseload of individual offices. I will focus on three possible dynamics which can explain the 
observed differences in finding: demographic factors, political will, and lack of cooperation.  
 
Firstly, although this model controls for the presence of cities and the African American 
population, there is still the potential for demographic factors not included in this model to have 
an impact on the level of funding for a pretrial services office. If such a variable could have an 
effect on both partisanship and the level of funding, this could be not captured in the model.  
 
Political will is a broad term I will use to describe directly political factors that influence county 
managers and other political actors who impact grant writing and fulfillment. Grant allotments 
are primarily based on previous funding, so decisions to apply for the funding in the first place 
are a key driver of funding in the present. The models presented above go to support a 
                                               
10 This is calculated as: 𝐸" = $%['((*)]$'((-.) . Where y is the amount of funding and x is the 
independent variable 
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conclusion that more conservative counties may be less likely to apply for funding, therefore 
contributing to the conservatism marginal effect.  
 
Finally, a main driver of funding for pretrial services, especially for rural counties is the fact that 
multiple counties can unite together in cooperation, sharing a pretrial services office. While 
cooperation takes place often among counties that also share a regional jail, that is not always the 
case. If in fact counties that have a similar partisan makeup to the counties around them are more 
likely to cooperate and jointly form a pretrial services office, this may be a driver of the 
difference observed among liberal and conservative counties. Alternatively, it may be that it is 
simply liberal counties that are more likely to cooperate, regardless of the partisan makeup of 
their adjacent partners. The next section of this study will focus on modeling interactions 
between counties in forming joint pretrial services office and factors that may affect the decision 
among county administrators to cooperate or not.   
 52 
Chapter 3: County Cooperation in Virginia 
 
County cooperation11 occurs when multiple municipalities partner to provide joint services to the 
residents of the municipalities participating in the cooperative agreement. County cooperation is 
a strategy widely used on a variety of issues, usually municipal services like trash removal or 
city water. The previous chapter has shown that the majority (69%) of pretrial services offices 
serve more than one locality and have come about because of cooperative funding and 
management between localities. Given that financial burdens prevent most counties from 
establishing a single-county pretrial services office, it is important to understand factors that 
promote or prevent county cooperation. In fact, this chapter will examine the hypothesis that 
more conservative counties are less likely to cooperate with surrounding counties due to 
differences in preference for pretrial services and beliefs about the role of pretrial services and 
local government broadly. 
 
Does Cooperation Help? 
 
Scholars generally agree that two conditions determine the likelihood of county cooperation: the 
seriousness of the underlying problem and the aggregate gains from solving the problem 
(Lubbell et al., 2002). Therefore, it is key to assess pretrial services’ suitability for gains from 
cooperation by examining the question of economies of scale.  
 
                                               
11 County cooperation is used here to refer to counties or cities cooperating with another county or city, not just 
cooperation between counties.  
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In fact, the question of potential gains from cooperation has been asked before. In 2012, the Joint 
Legislative Audit and Review Committee (JLARC) of Virginia published a report analyzing 
costs and benefits of state inducements for county-level cooperation. Among the programs 
researched as potential cost-saving measures was the use of pretrial services. This report found 
that “Expanding pretrial services to more localities has the potential to reduce State and local 
public safety costs, and could best be accomplished through regional collaboration” (JLARC, 
2012). Additionally, the committee found that most counties lack the scale required to justify a 
single pretrial services office. Rather, operating in the same area already served by a regional jail 
may provide a path forward, especially for smaller counties. JLARC surveyed 44 county 
administrators, 22 of whom indicated that they were “very interested” in expanding pretrial 
services to their county, indicating that there is at least some level of interest among county 
managers in expanding pretrial services. As discussed in the earlier chapter, interest on a survey 
may not translate to actionable interest. In 2016, when additional grant money became available 
only 15 out of 33 counties without pretrial services applied for additional funding. The 
committee concluded by recommending that more funds be appropriated to encourage both the 
establishment of pretrial services and regional cooperation surrounding pretrial services offices, 
explaining that expansion of pretrial services will ultimately save Virginia money in the long run 
through jail diversion.  
 
Scholarly Thought on County Cooperation 
 
Many scholars have studied interlocal cooperation (Feiock, 2007; Zeemering 2009). These 
studies have produced important takeaways and uncovered multiple factors that influence 
cooperation between and within counties. These studies primarily focus on municipal services 
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like waste removal or water treatment, which could benefit from the economies of scale that 
come with cooperation. While the fact that municipal services like trash collection must be taken 
on by some entity can be contrasted with the fact that it is possible for pretrial services to be 
absent; in both cases the county administrator must make the decision to cooperate or not. Since 
these studies focus on the decision-making process of county administrators, they contain many 
important insights. 
 
Additionally, these studies place an emphasis on counties working with cities that are within the 
county border. Because of the unique layout of Virginia municipalities, that is, cities are their 
own unit rather than being contained in a county, many of these conclusions must be slightly 
adapted before being applied to Virginia. For the purposes of this study, I identify three factors 
that have been shown to influence cooperation among municipalities: Administrator tenure, 
transaction costs, and homogeneity. 
 
In his 2009 study, Zeemering used surveys of county administrators in California to model 
factors that promote cooperation. Using an OLS model, Zeemering tested many factors ranging 
from opinion on the importance of intergovernmental relations to incumbent reelection rate and 
number of cities in a county. However, this study found that county homogeneity (using a proxy 
of percentage of people who identify as non-Hispanic whites) and population over 65 were the 
only two factors that achieved statistical significance. Increases in both of these factors were 
found to positively influence the likelihood that a county administrator would act as a broker in 
deals to expand county services through cooperation.  
Transaction costs also play an important role in cooperative coordination. One can think of many 
services provided by local governments that are not coordinated, simply because of prohibitively 
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high transaction costs. It would be unusual to see counties fifty miles apart from each other 
entering a joint garbage collection venture, yet we may observe these same counties cooperating 
with a regional jail or pretrial services program. This is because while transaction costs push 
counties to pursue goals individually, economies of scale incentivize counties to work together. 
Specifically, as it relates to pretrial services, physical buildings and staff can be shared by 
multiple counties, especially if they share a regional jail or are in close proximity to each other. 
For the purposes of this study, transaction costs will be modeled by county adjacency. County 
distance is a large driver of transaction costs in the context of pretrial services, especially 
because defendants will all need to access the same physical location, making geographically 
distant partnerships untenable.  
Finally, the influence of both internal (intra-county) and external homogeneity has been well 
documented in the research literature. Factors such as racial makeup, income and age have been 
shown to have a statistical relationship to the willingness of county administrators to enter into 
joint ventures with other counties. Zeemering suggests that this is due to the fact that 
homogenous county pairs will, in general, have more uniform goals and come to agreement more 
easily about how a service should be provided. For this analysis the percentage of black residents 
in each county will serve as a measure of homogeneity; this measure is the same used by 
Zeemering and has been shown in other studies to have a statistical and theoretical relationship 
to the presence of county cooperation.  
The Role of Partisanship in County Cooperation 
Economic rationale for interlocal collaboration and cooperation are generally well researched 
and accepted; however, one area that is less researched is how partisan factors may influence 
cooperation. To be sure, racial makeup, income, and age are strong drivers of partisan 
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preference. Could partisan attitudes impact cooperation above and beyond these components? I 
have shown in previous chapters that partisan preferences have a strong impact on both 
availability of pretrial services and the level of funding provided for pretrial services; yet it 
remains unclear if conservatives are ideologically opposed to the expansion of pretrial services. 
If partisan factors influence decisions to cooperate, whether conservative counties are more 
resistant to cooperation, or that counties prefer to cooperate with counties that are politically 
homogenous to themselves, cooperation effects could be a reasonable explanation for the 
differences in funding and availability observed in Virginia. The explanation of cooperation 
effects would be particularly powerful because it would explain the mechanism by which 
conservative counties are under-served without relying on the ideological platform of 
Republicans, which has not historically included explicit opposition to pretrial services.  
The first question that must be answered is how do political, if not partisan, factors influence 
decisions to cooperate or not. Policy entrepreneurs may agree to cooperative agreements if they 
believe that a cooperative arrangement can provide meaningful benefits to their constituents and 
that costs can be dispersed throughout the counties in the agreement. These agreements may be 
pursued by politicians who wish to advance their careers by promoting themselves to a larger 
constituency. Recent evidence has supported this contention by showing that politicians who 
engage in more interlocal cooperation are more likely to be successful in running for higher 
office (Bickers, Post, and Stein, 2009). In the same study, the authors note a dearth of empirical 
evidence to support the contention that political factors shape interlocal cooperation. This is most 
likely because most municipal services being studied such as trash collection, water, sewer, roads 
and fire departments are much less contentious that national issues like abortion, welfare and 
healthcare that dominate the public debate. Bickers et al. astutely note that “there is no 
Democratic or Republican way to collect garbage”. Their view may explain the lack of 
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compelling research on the subject but is a challenge to apply to the facts of pretrial services 
because the expansion of these programs has the potential to be more politically contentious than 
other municipal services.  
Bickers (2009) shows that conservative districts are indeed less likely to cooperate with 
surrounding districts and offers multiple explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, he suggests 
that Republican districts prefer service contracting with private entities rather than other 
municipalities. Second, he proposes that Republicans may simply prefer different types of 
cooperation based on their constituents. He explains, “At the local level, inter-jurisdictional 
arrangements that lead to economic development are likely to be more strongly preferred by 
Republicans, whereas such arrangements that provide social welfare benefits are more likely to 
be preferred by Democrats”. Bickers’ theory could provide a theoretical explanation for a 
hypothesis suggesting that conservative constituencies are indeed less likely to cooperate with 
other counties on the issue of pretrial services specifically.  
One additional consideration provided by Bickers is to examine county choice by liberal 
counties. He writes, “A more liberal community surrounded by more conservative counterparts 
may find its potential partners to be less compatible choices”.  This consideration could have a 
confounding effect on the statistical analysis in this chapter and will have to be carefully 
considered when interpreting the results. 
Given these factors, I will test hypotheses similar to Bickers et al.: 
H4: Counties with stronger Republican constituencies will be less likely to enter into pretrial 
services cooperative agreements. 
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H5: When conservative counties do enter into pretrial services cooperative agreements, they will 
be more likely to do so with other conservative counties.  
Measures and Methods 
The cooperation analysis in this chapter relies on the same underlying data as the Virginia county 
analysis. For the regression used here, data about pretrial services were combined with geospatial 
data to create a dataset of county pairs that are adjacent to each other12. This creates a list of 
candidate counties that could reasonably cooperate with each other with a binary variable for if 
the counties are indeed cooperating to fund a pretrial services office. Independent variables are 
recorded for each county then differenced to detect the impact of political or demographic 
difference in counties’ decisions to cooperate. Additionally, the percentage of votes for Trump in 
2016 in the first county is multiplied by the percentage of votes in the second county to create an 
interaction measure. Analysis will be run on two models: unrestricted and restricted. In the 
unrestricted model, duplicates are used to form a more complete picture of disparities in 
partisanship or demographic factors that may impact the decision to cooperate. For example, in 
the dataset there is an entry for both Williamsburg-York cooperation and the York-Williamsburg 
cooperation because the value of differenced independent variables will be different between 
those two observations. A restricted model without these duplicates will also be run to ensure 
that duplicating the information has not induced bias into the analysis;  27% of the candidate 
counties in the sample are cooperating.  
                                               
12 Because some pretrial districts are quite large, some counties that are cooperating are not adjacent. All pretrial 
service districts are contiguous, but each county is not necessarily adjacent to each cooperating county. All counties 
currently cooperating were selected in to this dataset. 
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To analyze the binary choice for counties cooperating or not, a maximum likelihood logit model 
is used and elasticities are calculated to better understand the effects of changes on the margins.  
Results 
 
Table 7: Unrestricted Model 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Logit Coefficients  
  
GOP Percentage for County A -8.168*** 
 (1.715) 
GOP Percentage for County B -4.241*** 
 (1.628) 
GOP Vote Percentage Interaction  14.86*** 
 (2.775) 
Black Percentage Difference .00000000129 
 (0.459) 
Total Population Difference  -0 
 (.000000719) 
Constant 1.019 
 (0.917) 
  
Observations 1,141 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Restricted Model 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Logit 
Coefficients 
  
GOP Percentage for County A -8.470*** 
 (2.485) 
GOP Percentage for County B -3.920* 
 (2.353) 
GOP Vote Percentage Interaction  14.84*** 
 (3.952) 
Black Percentage Difference 0.396 
 (0.753) 
Total Population Difference  .000000784 
 (.00000103) 
Constant 1.011 
 (1.306) 
  
Observations 571 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Discussion 
These results clearly show that more conservative counties are averse to cooperation and, when 
they do cooperate, they prefer to cooperate with other conservative counties. This finding is 
consistent with Bickers et al., who find that “The selection of partners for entering into… 
interlocal agreements is likely to be facilitated by having potential jurisdiction partners who 
share [the] same incentives” (2009).  
The elasticities of the first two variables, the percent GOP vote in county A and county B show 
that, in general conservative counties avoid entering in to cooperative pretrial services 
arrangements. Previous literature suggests that lack of cooperation on the part of Republican 
counties is due to Republican’s opposition to social welfare programs. The Encyclopedia of 
Political Science (Kurian, 2011) defines social welfare programs broadly as “any policy that 
 61 
improves the welfare of citizens”. However, pretrial services may not be viewed explicitly as a 
social welfare program by some because it does not target any specific group of people 
segmented by income. Nevertheless, if pretrial services expansion is coded as a social welfare 
program by either politicians or members of the public, this could go to explain Republican 
opposition.  
The sign of the coefficient for the interaction coefficient is also instructive. Higher interaction 
values represent district pairs that are jointly more conservative. This finding also comports with 
the framework provided by Bickers et al., even if the authors did not explicitly provide for this 
kind of effect. If localities seek to cooperate only on issues that they deem important, it follows 
that when conservative counties do cooperate, they would cooperate with other conservative 
counties whose vision for pretrial services may be more in line with theirs. In Virginia, the risk 
recommendation process is routinized so one would not expect to see differences in 
recommendation rates, but pretrial services offices that come out of conservative county 
cooperation may receive less funding or have more restrictive supervision terms if there was 
meaningful differentiation between conservative and liberal service districts for pretrial services 
offices.  
Ultimately, these results provide a compelling explanation for the relationship between 
conservative constituencies and lack of pretrial services that has been uncovered in the preceding 
chapters. Because conservatives generally do not explicitly stake out positions against the 
expansion of pretrial services, the strong relationship between the two seems odd. However, if 
some part of that cooperation can be explained by county-level opposition to cooperation, it 
follows that there is a genuine non-policy specific reason why conservatism curtails pretrial 
services expansion.  
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Conclusion  
 
Pretrial reform efforts have made news across the country, especially in 2018 and 2019. These 
reforms show great promise to reduce the number of people in America detained pre-trial. New 
actuarial tools as well as supervisory offices provide promising opportunities to routinize the risk 
determination process and make structural changes that increase the safety of the community 
when allowing release. 
 
However, when examining the distribution of states and counties that benefit from pretrial 
services offices, interesting patterns emerge. Popular support and endorsements from 
practitioners ranging from prosecutors to judges to defense attorneys are sharply contrasted with 
what would appear to be public opposition to pretrial reform. There are two possible avenues for 
action or lack thereof: legislative and bureaucratic.  
 
Legislative inaction is fairly straightforward to explain. Taking any policy position is risky. 
Legislators calculate that groups of supporters are too small, too disconnected or too apathetic 
for it to be worthwhile to stake out a policy position. Legislators in states that have passed reform 
have overcome these challenges largely through the assurances from activist communities, or 
attentive publics. These attentive publics provide pressure on inactive politicians and support for 
politicians who are supportive of reform, shifting the legislative calculus in favor of instituting 
pretrial reform. However, reform is not a binary decision. Between states with full statewide 
reform and those with a total lack of funding for pretrial services lie a plurality of states which 
have partial coverage. These states are particularly influenced by bureaucratic decision because 
legislators do not provide statewide funding but do make some form of funding available. 
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Bureaucrats may then decide if they want to cooperate with other counties to create a pretrial 
services office or even if they want to apply for pretrial services funding from the state. When 
bureaucrats are tasked with exercising their discretion, a number of outcomes are possible, but 
patterns that reflect how decisions are impacted by partisan factors may emerge over large areas. 
This is what we observed in Virginia pretrial services. This study has shown that measures of 
partisanship have strong predictive power in explaining which districts have pretrial services 
offices and how much funding those offices receive. This is likely due to cooperation effects; 
districts with stronger conservative constituencies are less likely to cooperate with other districts 
and favor cooperating with other conservative districts.  
 
These findings hold lessons for scholars of partisanship. Public opinion on expansion of pretrial 
services is virtually nonexistent. Yet, there is recognizable sorting among party lines for counties 
that have pretrial services. Is this a triumph of democracy or simply a coincidence? The answer 
likely lies in between. Surely, politicians and bureaucrats are influenced by what they expect to 
be the political sentiment of their district, and expansion of pretrial services could easily be 
coded as an unwanted social welfare policy. This political explanation is complicated by 
evidence from chapter 3 that shows that even though cooperation is necessary for most counties 
to have pretrial services, conservative counties are less willing to cooperate than their liberal 
counterparts. Additionally, the fact that when conservatives do cooperate, they tend to do it with 
other conservative counties lends credence to the idea that there is an effect specific to 
cooperation that goes above and beyond simple willingness to have pretrial services.  
 
Ultimately, this study goes to show that opposition to pretrial reform is asymmetric. Reformers 
and activists should carefully consider the causes and sources of opposition to reform when 
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crafting bureaucratic or legislative remedies to the problem of pretrial detention.  And pretrial 
detention is a problem in desperate need of remedies and attention.  
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